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THE SUPREME COURT AND A CHANGING ANTITRUST
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By LAURENCE I. WOOD t
The tri-partite division of powers, which is the pattern of our
Constitutional government, contemplates individual supremacy in each
branch-Executive, Legislative, and Judicial-save only as its powers
may be subject to the checks and balances provided by the other two.
There are, however, certain marginal areas wherein it is well nigh im-
possible for one branch to fulfill its assigned functions without imping-
ing upon the designated prerogative of another.
Where the members of the federal judiciary are concerned with
matters purely judicial in character, as in the interpretation and ap-
plication of the Constitution and basic principles of law, their authority
is solitary and supreme. But, to the extent that the activities of the
Supreme Court involve the interpretation, the application, or the exten-
sion of federal statutes, the legislature is properly concerned in review-
ing the activities and pronouncements of the Court. It is indeed true,
as Charles Evans Hughes has said, that "the Constitution is what the
judges say it is." But where federal statutes are concerned, the word
of the Court should not be final, and the Congress is free to exercise a
vigilant supervision over any interpretation or re-interpretation given'
its own handiwork.
' Member of the New York and Illinois Bars. Lecturer on Law, Rutgers Uni-
versity, 1947-48. Author of PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1942); THE UIrrED
STATES PATENT SYsTEm: A SURVEY (1946). Assistant General Counsel, General Elec-
tric Company. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the General Electric Company.
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There has been much discussion in recent legal literature of the
proposition that the Court has surrendered to "political activists" and
that the doctrine of "judicial self-restraint" has fallen into desuetude.1
Evidence in support of this charge has been gleaned primarily
from the field of governmental regulation of business, as exemplified
most dramatically in the antitrust area.
But a charge of legislative activity in this field cannot be levelled
exclusively at the current court. For judicial drafting of the antitrust
laws has been a constant process-delayed or hastened only in propor-
tion to the activity of the law enforcement agencies--ever since the
passage, in 1890, of the Sherman Act. Indeed, that Act by its very
nature-being, as it is, a broadly phrased uncodified statute-has neces-
sarily been built upon and has grown through a large body of inter-
pretative decisions. Each new opinion constitutes a delineation of
some aspect, large or small, of the over-all Sherman Act. Over the
period of nearly sixty years, Supreme Court decisions have built up
in many portions of the field a fairly complete framework against which
business institutions and business practices can be measured.
The Congress has itself, from time to time, undertaken to add to
this over-all framework through certain additional statutes such as
the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, the Webb-Pomerene Act, and the Miller-
Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act. Together with these stat-
utory modifications the landmark cases in the field have come to present
a more or less standard body of law, subject, of course to the flux of
conditions both economic and political and to the growth which in-
evitably attends any field dealing with the relationship of government
to business. Thus it is that with every decision the Court is, to the
extent that the facts before it present novel questions as against those
embodied in any previous decision, subject to the charge that it has
legislated.
Certainly it has been true during the entire history of the anti-
trust laws that the decisions of the Court have been based more on
the contemporary economic or political views of the individual judges
than on legislative history or judicial precedent. The Sherman Act
is particularly susceptible to this practice, in part because of the lack
of adequate precedent in many of the areas of this politico-economic
field; more fundamentally, the tendency has arisen from the antipathy
1. See Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNX, Jan., 1947, p. 73. This
author divides the Court into what he calls the Black-Douglas group and the Frank-
furter-Jackson group. The objective of the former is "the employment of the Judicial
power of their own conception of the social good"; of the latter: recognizing "the
range of allowable judgment for legislatures, even if it means upholding conclusions
they privately condemn."
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of the judges of one day toward the economic principles and philosophy
of the earlier judges who wrote what had until then been the landmark
decisions.
For the first twenty years of its existence the Sherman Act was
construed as applying literally to every contract in restraint of trade; 2
in 1911 this doctrine was sharply reversed by the adoption of the
"rule of reason" which specified that only those restraints or monopolies
which were unreasonable came within the sanctions of the Act.3 This
latter rule continued unabated until, within the past decade, the Court
has undertaken to delineate certain species of restraints which it holds
per se unreasonable, and hence without the protection of the "rule of
reason." 4 These major shifts in policy have been flanked by a multi-
tude of relatively minor reversals and tangents in which the Court has
at one time or another concluded that the Sherman Act has meant
something very different from that which earlier members of the same
Court had decreed.
There is--or should be-a sharp distinction between the two
types of judicial activity. To the extent that the statute is but a broad
precept proclaiming a worthwhile objective the members of the Court
have no alternative but to give body to that statute by designating, as
they are considered, the practices which fall within and those which fall
without its prohibitions. Legislative though this activity be, it is the
type of legislation which the Congress by its very vagueness has forced
upon, and hence delegated to, the Court.5
The action of the Court, however, in cancelling out its own express
additions to the statute is a far more serious type of practice. It is
the unfortunate fact that the present Court has been, more than any
2. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
3. Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S. 106 (1911).
4. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940) ; International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947). See United States v. Columbia Steel, 334
U. S. 495, 524 (1948). A parallel shift in emphasis in the concept of monopoly has
occurred since 1911, when the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1
(1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911), relied on
a record of both predatory tactics and an "overwhelming" share of the market. In
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920), and United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927), the Court made it clear that it
was not the size, but the tactics which made for illegality. In the subsequent United
States v. Swift and Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932), and United States v. Aluminum Co.,
148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the concept was reversed so that size, i. e., market con-
trol-not predatory acts, became the criterion of innocence or guilt. See Adelman,
Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1306-9 (1948).
5. See Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the
Court Says, 34 A. B. A. J. 535, 537 (1948) : ". . . The unfortunate fact is that
neither Congress in the choice of language it will use, nor the Courts in the meanings
they will ascribe to Congress, have really effective guidance from consistently accepted
principles of interpretation. . . . For the individual justice to be left so much at
large presents opportunity and temptation to adopt interpretations that fit his predilec-
tions as to what he would like the statute to mean if he were a legislator. Indeed,
sometimes there is not much else to guide him. . ....
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other in the history of the Act, prone to disregard the rulings of earlier
trade regulation cases. Indeed, the ascendency in the Supreme Court
of this "political activist" philosophy ' has, within the past few years,
threatened the framework of this entire body of law. This has been
evidenced in an increasingly wholesale disregard for judicial precedent
in the antitrust field, as well as for the legislative history-no matter
how clear or emphatic in the Congressional reports-of various federal
statutes.
The proper criticism of this practice is not that it constitutes
legislating-for in the vacant areas that is what the Court must do.
Rather the proper protest must be against the fact that the Court is
relegating stare decisis to the scrap heap and that it seems to be taking
it unto itself to remake the law to conform to its own ideas of what is
proper, what is morally just, and what is economically sound.
Criticism of this trend is by no means to be understood as an
expression of opinion on the merits of any case, nor necessarily of the
result reached by the Court. Certainly, all recognize the continuing
need for vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws. The issue is
rather of the propriety of the judges' self-assumed role of reshaping
those laws to make illegal practices which were previously held to be
legal or which were clearly not intended to be outlawed by the Congress
in enacting that legislation.
7
A corollary but important problem arises in connection with the
inevitable widespread feeling of uneasiness and suspicion which per-
meates the business community where the law is powerful but un-
settled, vigorous but vague. The businessman and his advisers are
scarcely to be blamed for a feeling of intense bitterness against a system
of law whereby it is possible for a defendant to be convicted of a crime
6. Id. at 536: ". . . to observe the democratic separation of functions so as to
leave policy making to the political bodies and make the function of interpretation a
professional matter, requires training, constant intellectual effort, deliberation and de-
tachment ..
That these are perhaps not always the underlying factors in federal judicial ap-
pointments, see Wiley, A Free Judiciary, 34 A. B. A. J. 441, 442 (1948). Since 1932,
of 231 federal judges appointed, 214 were Democrats; 17 Republicans. "It seems pain-
fully apparent that political allegiance was the one factor which dominated appoint-
ments."
7. ". . . The prestige of the Court is threatened, if it has not already been seri-
ously impaired, by recent divisions of opinion within the Court and its reversal of
precedents that had come to be regarded as enduring landmarks of the law. . . !"
Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings: A Study of Developments in the Supreme Court,
34 A. B. A. J. 554 (1948).
"The question is what standards shall control judicial lawmaking. . . . The
adherents of Frankfurter feel that Black and Douglas, by substituting their own for
the legislative preference, tend toward a state of judicial despotism that threatens the
democratic process. All legislation in a democracy, they point out, is the product of
compromise among conflicting interests. The rough intrusion of the Court into this
delicate equipoise may well upset a precarious balance of social forces ... " Schles-
inger, supra note 1, at 206.
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for the doing of acts which have until then been held to be proper,
simply because the present members of that tribunal do not agree with
those who previously comprised the Supreme Court. In the words of
Mr. Justice Jackson, ". . . Unless the assumption is substantially true
that cases will be disposed of ,by application of known principles and
previously disclosed courses of reasoning, our common-law process
would become the most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial law-
making . . ." 8
There has thus been developing in recent years what appears to
be an attempt toward a substantial rewriting of the law in the anti-
trust field by members of the Supreme Court.
It will be our attempt to review the developments of this law in
some of its more important aspects, as those developments have been
effected by recent Supreme Court decisions.
THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
The patent statutes have been developed, codified, and amplified
over a period of some 160 years. They are based, of course, upon
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution which provides for the grant
by Congress to inventors of the exclusive right to their discoveries for
a limited period of time. It is universally accepted that the patent
system has played a most important part in the development of our
economy-this recognition coming from those who are opposed to the
present form of the system, as well as from those who are its staunchest
advocates. In the main, the system has remained virtually unchanged
in the past 100 years, although it has, of course, undergone many
amendments and revisions designed to coordinate it with the vast
growth of our economy and our industry.
The system in its present form has been generally acclaimed by
groups such as President Roosevelt's National Patent Planning Com-
mission; in some of its aspects it has been harshly criticized by groups
such as the TNEC. Both of these bodies submitted to Congress recom-
mendations for changes which they thought would be beneficial to the
patent system. Those presented by the National Patent Planning
Commission were directed toward the more efficient administration of
the patent laws, for the purpose of providing better protection for
inventors and of eliminating certain abuses which have arisen in the
many technical aspects of Patent Office procedure. The recommenda-
tions of the TNEC were in the direction of removing the exclusiveness
of the patent grant and narrowing its scope. It is significant that
none of these proposals which sought to narrow, reduce, or materially
8. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944).
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alter the scope of the protection given to the patentee has been adopted
by Congress, or even received favorable committee action.
The Supreme Court, however, has-in part at the instance of the
Antitrust Division, which group was a predominant factor in the
TNEC recommendations-made a most drastic series of changes in
the entire structure of the patent system. Its decisions have resulted
in an increasingly constant attrition in the scope and value of the
patent grant.
A. Contributory Infringement
In the last ten years the Supreme Court has, by a series of deci-
sions, virtually abolished the doctrine of contributory infringement-
a doctrine which had been recognized by all federal courts in a con-
sistent line of decisions over the past seventy years. This doctrine
arose from the application to the patent law of the general legal prin-
ciple that one who causes a wrong is as guilty as one who actually
commits the wrong. The doctrine was developed by the courts to
prohibit not only the actual infringement of the patent but also the
direct inducement of infringement by supplying someone else with the
means and directions for infringing the patent. One who makes a
special device constituting the heart of a patented machine and supplies
it to others with directions to complete the machine is obviously ap-
propriating the benefit of the patented invention.
Where a patent is being thus infringed by a large number of
scattered individuals all of whom have been caused to infringe by
the same person, the practical way to stop the infringement is to sue
the one causing the infringement, rather than the multitude of persons
who are directly infringing. In the case of many inventions-
especially chemical processes or combination or system patents-such
a contributory infringement suit is the only practicable way of en-
forcing the patent, as where the persons directly infringing the patent
claims are the ultimate users or consumers.
It is for this reason that this doctrine has been characterized by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter as "an expression both of law and morals." '
But in a series of recent cases 1o the Supreme Court has virtually
abolished the patentees' right to protection against contributory in-
fringement. It has done this by the simple expedient of refusing relief
9. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent, 320 U. S. 661, 667 (1944) (dissenting opin-
ion).
10. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27 (1931);
Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458 (1938); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
314 U. S. 495 (1942) ; Mercoid Corp. v Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320
U. S. 680 (1944) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent, 320 U. S. 661 (1944). See, gen-
erally, Wood, Tangle of Mercoid Implications, 13 GEo. WASr. L. REv. 61 (1944).
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to a patentee suing the one supplying the material inducing the
infringement.
This has grown from the Court's own doctrine of "misuse of
patents" (first expressed in these cases). This doctrine was born of
a proper purpose, for it was aimed at several flagrant instances wherein
a patent had been used to gain control over the marketing of an un-
patented staple, used in connection with the patent. The Court met
the situation, by deciding that it would, as a dispenser of equity, with-
hold its aid from one thus seeking to extend the scope of his patent.
And, the court concludes, if a patentee sues to enjoin someone from
selling an unpatented material he must be extending the protection
afforded by the patent. The difficulty is that this ignores the fact that
in the traditional contributory infringement case all that the court is
asked to enjoin is the sale of an unpatented material sold for the
purpose of inducing infringement of the patent-a sale which the
supplier has no legal right to make.
So far have the courts gone in their anxiety to confine the patent's
scope that they will even refuse relief against a direct infringer where
they conclude that the suit against him is but a circuitous means of
stopping the contributory infringer who cannot be directly sued."1
Although actions for contributory infringement are not directly
outlawed, the Court now seems to hold that the mere act of bringing
the suit constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws, since it is an
attempt to control an unpatented commodity." This doctrine is so
complex and confused that no court and no patent attorney can be
sure in any given fact situation as to whether the use is proper or
whether it is such as will deny the patent owner the relief to which he
is by statute entitled. To the protests of the patentees that the ap-
plication of this doctrine is vitiating whole categories of patents, au-
thorized by statute to be issued, the courts give an unsympathetic
shrug. 3 Thus, through purely "judicial" activity, many inventors
have been denied the right to exploit or utilize their patents in con-
nection with their business. This is so no matter how innocent their
intention may be; it applies indiscriminately to the exploitation of
whole classes of patents-patents authorized by law to be issued by
11. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, supra note 10; American Lecithin Co. v. War-
field, 105 F. 2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 609 (1939).
12. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent, 320 U. S. 661 (1944). That this is doc-
trinally unsound, see Roberts, J., dissenting, at 674. See also Wood, Tangle of Mer-
coid Case Implications, 13 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 64, 66 (1944).
13. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U. S. 495, 498 (1942) : "It is without signifi-
cance that . . . it is not practicable to exploit the patent right by granting licenses.
. . . The patent monopoly is not enlarged by reason of the fact that . . . he can-
not avail himself of its benefits within the limits of the grant."
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the U. S. Patent Office. This situation is so obviously unfair and
unsatisfactory that steps have already been undertaken to correct it.'
4
B. License Limitations
One of the most significant areas of the antitrust field is that
which involves the validity of price restrictions or limitations imposed
by the patentee upon his licensees. It has, since 1902, been the ac-
cepted construction of the Sherman Act and of the patent statutes that
these restrictions, imposed by a patent owner when he issues a license
under his patent, are properly within the scope of the patent grant.15
This rule was reaffirmed and reapplied by a unanimous court in 1926
in United States v. General Electric, the Court stating that such a
limitation is entirely proper, "provided the conditions of sale are
normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly." 16
Despite the clarity and unanimity of these decisions, the Depart-
ment of Justice has, ever since 1937, made no secret of the fact that
it was antipathetic to that rule and that it considered it to be inimical
to its efforts to enforce the Sherman Act. The Artitrust Division
accordingly attempted both through the recommendations of the
TNEC, and through its own representatives before the Congress, to
have the statutes amended to remove this area from the legitimate
scope of the patent grant. These repeated efforts to obtain Congres-
sional amendment were unsuccessful despite prolonged and actively
conducted hearings by several Congressional committees." The
National Patent Planning Commission recommended to the President
and to Congress that no such change be made.'"
14. Hearings of House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1948). The Subcommittee on Patents favorably reported the bill to the Judiciary
Committee. The Supreme Court has also in recent years made large inroads on the
doctrine of estoppel as it applies to patent licensees and patent assignees. Over the
period of nearly a century, the Court evolved and applied the doctrine that an inventor
who assigned his patent to another could not thereafter challenge the validity of his
own invention. Similarly, it was held that one who took a license under a patent
could not be heard to attack the validity of the patent. The Supreme Court has now
decided that those doctrines have, in large part, been wrongly applied over the past
many years. Katsinger v. Chicago Metallic, 329 U. S. 394 (1947) ; Scott v. Marcalus,
326 U. S. 249 (1945).
15. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902). See, generally, for a
review of the development of the law in this field, Wood, Patent Combinations and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 17 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 59 (1948).
16. 272 U. S. 476, 490 (1926).
17. For example, see Hearings before Committee on Patents on S. 2303 and S.
2491, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ; Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs,
Subcommittee on Technological Mobilization on S. 2721, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ;
Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee on Technological
Mobilization on S. 702, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
18. Such a change "would not be a beneficial innovation in our patent system."
H. R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1943).
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Concurrent with and despite the unsuccessful legislative campaign
was a much more successful effort to obtain court revision of the law.
Since 1938 the Supreme Court has in a series of decisions made in-
creasingly sharp inroads on the doctrine which permits a patentee to
impose reasonable limitations upon licensees under his patent. 9 In
March, 1948, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Line Material
case "practically overruled", in the words of Attorney General Clark,
the decisions which have for over 45 years upheld this right as part
of the patentee's prerogative.20
Seeming support is given to this too extreme interpretation by
the dictum of Mr. Justice Douglas in the subsequent Paramount case"'
wherein he apparently construes the General Electric decision as per-
mitting a patentee to fix the prices of one licensee only, an interpreta-
tion which would surely have surprised not only the nine judges
deciding the earlier case, but also any subsequent court.2
Certainly in the whole area of license restrictions the situation is
confused and uncertain. Since the penalty for "improper" actions in
the field is to be held to have violated the antitrust law-a statute of
criminal as well as civil penalties-it is obvious that the uncertainty
and confusion, which are sufficient to baffle the most renowned experts
in the field, cannot but be exasperating and serious to the businessmen
faced with the practical problem of utilizing their property rights in
19. Cf. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939) ; Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940) ; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U. S. 241 (1942) ; United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948). Each
of these cases distinguished, without finding it necessary to pass upon, the General
Electric case. All involved licensed price control provisions; all were held illegal.
20. 333 U. S. 287 (1948). Actually the eight judges participating were evenly
divided on sustaining the General Electric decision. Mr. Justice Reed, in writing the
prevailing opinion, approved of the General Electric opinion, but held it inapplicable to
the facts presented. Mr. Justice Jackson disqualified himself. It is presumed, in the
light of his contemporaneous opinion in United States v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,
334 U. S. 771 (1948), that he would vote to sustain the earlier Court interpretation of
the statutes involved. Even on this assumption, Mr. Justice Reed's will remain the
deciding vote.
21. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 144 (1948).
This was a seven justice opinion; no justice expressed disagreement with this dictum.
22. "A, a proprietor of a patent, licenses C, D, and E to manufacture the patented
article and to sell it for not less than a stated price. The condition of the license fix-
ing the price is not illegal." RESTATEMENT, CONmACTS § 515, comment 12 (1932).
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 456 (1940) : "He [the pat-
entee] may grant licenses . . . restricted in point of space or time, or with any
other restriction . . ."; Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 228
(1939) : "Granted that each distributor . . . was free to impose the present restric-
tions upon his licensees. . . ." Cf. Mr. Justice Reed in United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U. S. 287, 311: "Where two or more patentees with competitive, non-infring-
ing patents combine them and fix prices . . . competition is impeded to a greater
degree than where a single patentee fixes prices for his licensees." Mr. Justice Doug-
las, id. at 315-6: ". . . it is a part of practical wisdom and good law not to permit
United States v. General Electric Co. to govern this situation, though if its premise be
accepted, logic might make its application to this case [of ten licensees] wholly de-
fensible." (Emphasis added.)
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the most feasible fashion. For the likelihood of being held to have
been in criminal misuse of patent rights simply because of a technical
construction of the Sherman Act, pursuant to the current economic
belief of the Supreme Court, is a very real one.2" So complete is this
uncertainty and confusion that the most distinguished judges hesitate
to pass on questions of law in this field. Judge Learned Hand in
the Aluminum Company case expressly refused to pass on a question
presented on the ground that "the whole subject is plainly in flux, and
we do not wish to pass upon it unless we have to do so." 24 Yet, under
the recent Supreme Court decisions, if a patent owner is to utilize his
property actively in his business, he must resolve the same doubts at
the peril of a criminal conviction.
C. Government Attacks on Validity
In 1897 the Supreme Court laid down the rule that where a patent
has been issued by the Patent Office, the Department of Justice may
not, in a suit to cancel the patent, subsequently attack the decision of
the Patent Office on the ground that the invention was not truly
patentable. 5
For the question of patentability is the very issue which the
Government passes on in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function 26
of granting the patent, through the trained experts of the Patent Office.
Once that determination was made and the patent issued, the inventor
was to be entitled to rely on the protection which it gives.
There has recently been an increasing controversy as to whether
this doctrine of estoppel was to prevent an attack by the government
on the validity of its own patents in an antitrust action. 7  The at-
23. At the trial in the Carboloy case, Judge Knox asked Government Counsel:
"Suppose the defendants acted in good faith, honestly believing the patent to be valid:
Could they be convicted in a criminal prosecution?"
Mr. Berman: "I think, your Honor, I would have to say they could, because it is
our position, and I think a position in which the cases sustain us, that the good faith
of the defendants is an immaterial issue in an antitrust case." Transcript of Record,
p. 1725, United States v. Carboloy, 80 F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
24. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945).
25. United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224 (1897).
26. See Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 67 (1884).
27. Compare United States v. Porcelain Appliance Corp., Equity No. 1640, N. D.
Ohio, 1926 (defendant's motion in antitrust suit to strike plaintiff's allegations of pat-
ent invalidity denied); Crosby Steam Gage and Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell &
Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972 (D. Mass. 1943) (Government's motion to intervene,
alleging in part the invalidity of plaintiff's patent, was granted over plaintiff's opposi-
tion) ; with United States v. Hartford-Empire, N. D. Ohio, 1946 (Government's
attempt to attack validity of patents in proceedings before Master denied) ; United
States v. Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889 (D. D. C. 1943) (Government may not attack
validity of patents in antitrust suit). United States v. American Optical Co., Civil
No. 10-391, S. D. N. Y., 1948 (courf refused to permit Government to attack patent's
validity in antitrust suit); International Business Machines v. United States, 298
U. S. 131, 137 (1936) (". . in every suit brought to set aside the tying clause . . .
the suit could usually result in no binding adjudication as to the validity of the patent,
since infringement would not be in issue").
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tempted attack was for the purpose of having held illegal practices
entered into in reliance on the existence of the patents.
Under the long line of decisions already referred to, it has been
recognized that the patentee, as part of the legitimate exploitation of
his patent, may impose certain limitations as to territory, type, quan-
tity, price, or use." But such restrictions might well be violative of
the Sherman Act if imposed in the absence of a valid patent grant.
The Department of Justice and others have sought repeatedly,
over a period of years, to have Congress change or limit the rule of
the Telephone case to permit an attack on the validity of patents in an
antitrust suit.29  Congress has persistently refused to so rewrite the
law.
The Department's argument has been that inasmuch as it was
free to attack the validity of patents asserted against it in the Court
of Claims, 0 it would be inconsistent to deny it a similar freedom in
antitrust proceedings.81 The logical appeal of this argument is ap-
parent; its weakness lies in its ex post facto effects.
For where a patentee in good faith reliance on his patent enters
into bona fide agreements-perfectly proper under the present law-it
is harsh, indeed, to subject him to retroactive civil and criminal
liability by allowing a subsequent attack on the patent as a means of
rendering "illegal" all he did pursuant to it. If such an attack were to
be permitted, it would mean that the court could send the inventor and
his licensee to jail because they relied upon a patent issued by the
Government. 2 Certainly, if the United States Patent Office believed
that a real invention had been made, it was scarcely unreasonable-let
alone criminal-for the inventor to act to build up his business in
reliance on the grant.
The interests of both the public and the individual patent owner
would appear to be best reconciled by a rule permitting the Govern-
ment to question the validity of the patent in such suits, but to deny
any retroactive effect to the determination.
In the Gypsum case, the Supreme Court, in a "deliberate"
dictum,88 appears to have gone beyond any such middle ground, Mr.
28. McCormack, Restrictive Patent Licenses and Restraint of Trade, 31 CoL. L.
REv. 743 (1931).
29. Cf. H. R. 97, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ; H. R. 3462, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945) ; S. 2482, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
30. Farnham v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 19 (1913) ; Morse Arms Co. v. United
States, 16 Ct. Cl. 296 (1880).
31. See Government Memorandum On Its Right to Show Invalidity of Hartford's
Patents, pp. 22-26, United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., N. D. Ohio, 1948.
32. See note 23 supra. This problem is of course distinct from that wherein the
patents are used as a mere excuse for imposing the restrictions, with no bona fide be-
lief in their validity. Cf. the Gypsum case, note 19 mipra.
33. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in United States v. U. S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 408 (1948).
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Justice Reed stating that in an equity antitrust case the Government
"should have the . . . opportunity to show that the asserted shield
of patentability does not exist." 34 Were the same rule to be applied
to criminal prosecutions it is apparent that a serious problem of judicial
ex post facto law-making would arise.
D. Effect on the Patent System
Any Sherman Act proceeding, civil or criminal, is a serious mat-
ter. The damage which may result from the foregoing changes in the
patent system is enormous, for it may be argued that they threaten the
very incentive which it is the purpose of the patent laws to create.
The depreciation in the value of the patent property right which
results from these decisions is, of course, tremendous, and there is
legitimate cause for concern lest these cases have so completely re-
written the patent statutes in regard to the antitrust laws that the
incentives intended by the Constitution and the Congress to be
furnished through the patent system may be seriously impaired. 5
34. Id. at 371. The opinion of the statutory three-judge court in United States
v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889 (D. D. C. 1943), was thereby reversed. Judge
Stephens of the lower court had said that if any change were to be made in the rule
of law, it should be made by legislation and not by the courts.
The statement finds support in a number of isolated intimations found in Supreme
Court opinions in civil antitrust suits:
"The Government has not put in issue the validity of the lens patents, but argues
that their scope does not extend beyond the structure of the lens blanks and conse-
quently afford no basis for the Corporation's restrictions on the sale of the finished
lenses which the wholesalers and finishing retailers fashion from blanks purchased from
the Lens Company. . . . The record gives no account of the prior art and does not
provide us with other material to which, if available, resort might appropriately be
had in determining the nature of an alleged invention and the validity and scope of the
patent claims founded." (Emphasis added.) United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U. S. 241, 248 (1942).
"Inasmuch as the Government did not appeal from these findings, we need not
consider . . . the validity or scope of the . . . patents." United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 283 U. S. 163, 181 (1931).
"In considering that question we assume the validity of the patents which is not
questioned here." Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 456 (1940).
"We assume argquendo that the patents in question . . are valid." United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 276 (1942).
35. Another important illustration of judicial revision of a law which Congress
failed to rewrite is in those cases where patents have been misused. Here the Court
has taken it unto itself to provide for compulsory licensing of patents-a remedy which
Congress has repeatedly been asked, for over thirty-five years, to provide and has con-
sistently failed to enact. Oldfield Hearings, Purmant to H. R. 23, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. 417 (1912) ; Stanley Bill Hearings, Senate Patent Committee, 67th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1922) ; McFarlane Hearings on Compulsory Licensing, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1938). And see the FINAL REPORT OF THE TNEC (1941).
In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), on rehearing,
324 U. S. 570 (1945), perpetual compulsory licensing was decreed under patents which
had been granted to members of an illegal conspiracy; and in United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947), the Court provided that there should be compulsory
licensing under all patents owned by the defendants or which they might acquire
within five years after the decree. Similarly, in the "misuse" cases the Court has re-
fused to enforce patents authorized by statute to be granted, where the ultimate basis
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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FIELD
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
Congress in the new Administrative Procedure Act 36 expressly
provides that persons subject to proceedings before administrative
tribunals are entitled to have the findings of those tribunals passed
upon by a reviewing court, that the reviewing Court is to consider
the defendants' contention that the findings are "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence . . .", and that the court is to "review the whole
record" in making such determinations. Yet there is little indication
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Cement case that those
explicit instructions were heeded.37 Although making occasional use
of the phrase "substantial evidence", the Court stated that its "problem
in reviewing the findings in this case" as made by the FTC was
"whether the Commission['s] . . . findings of concerted action . . .
are supported by evidence.. ," 38 After emphasizing the great
weight which it attaches to the Federal Trade Commission's findings,
the Court concluded simply: "We think . . . that the findings have
support in the evidence." "' It is difficult to believe that such a legis-
lative requirement can ever be effective so long as the Commission
cases continue in such gigantic proportions. The Cement record was
of "incredible size," 3" some one hundred thousand pages. Certainly
it is impossible for appellate judges to absorb more than a fraction
of such a massing of testimony piled upon exhibits. It is scarcely
surprising that in such circumstances "there is no tendency for mis-
takes on the facts to be corrected by the higher tribunals." S"b
for the denial of relief frequently lies in the fact that the patentee can exploit his pat-
ent only in a given way-a way of which the Court does not approve.
See also Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, Civil No. 18-6, S. D. N. Y., Oct., 1948,
where Judge Leibell, having found certain of ASCAP's practices to be illegal enjoined
ASCAP "from attempting directly or indirectly to enforce the motion picture per-
forming rights of any musical compositions against any one as long as ASCAP con-
tinues as an illegal combination and monopoly . . . ," and a similar prohibition re-
straining the individual members of ASCAP "while they continue as members of
ASCAP."
36. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009 (Supp. 1947).
37. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948). The Act became effective
nine days before the Circuit Court of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court failed to
mention the Act.
38. Id. at 709. Cf. id. at 712, 719.
39. Id. at 709. The Court concludes its discussion of the special plea of several
West Coast companies by saying: "Our conclusion is that there was evidence to sup-
port the Commission's findings. . . ." Id. at'720.
Cf. Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Commission, Supreme Court Docket
No. 477, Petition for Certiorari filed December 23, 1948, on the ground that the court
of appeals did not give an adequate review of the record as required by the Act. The
court of appeals opinion is reported at 168 F. 2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
39a. Adelman, mipra note 4, at 1340.
39b. Id. at 1344. ". . . if we are to have judicial review, some way must be
found of distilling the facts and making their implications clear to the Courts."
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B. "Unfair Methods of Competition"
In the interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission Act itself,
the Court, in the Cement case, in effect over-ruled a twenty-eight year
old judicial landmark. The Federal Trade Commission Act provides
that the FTC shall have authority to issue cease and desist orders
against "unfair methods of competition." The Supreme Court ruled
in FTC v. Gratz4o that this delegation to the Commission was, of
course, subject to the review of the Courts and that what was to
constitute an unfair method of competition must be in the final analysis
a matter for judicial determination, not for ultimate decision by an
administrative body.41 With this policy laid down as a guide to the
Commission and the Courts, Congress not only did not undertake to
dispute the interpretation of the Gratz case but, indeed, in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act it strengthened that decision, stipulating
that in all such administrative proceedings the final interpretation of
every statute and of every question of law was to be for the Courts.'
Yet, in the Cement Institute case the Supreme Court goes out of
its way to indicate its complete want of sympathy with its rule in the
Gratz case and to say that it will accept not only the findings of the
Commission-so long as there is some evidence to support those find-
ings-but also the conclusions of law made by the Commission as to
what constitutes an unfair method of competition. This complete
reliance is on the rather remarkable ground that the Commission con-
stitutes a group of "experts" who must accordingly be given a free
hand in determining what constitutes an "unfair trade practice."
This presumably leaves it entirely to the whim of the five Commis-
,sioners to decide what business practices-no matter how widely used,
no matter how historic or how valuable those practices may be-are
to be held to be illegal and violative of law.48
A member of the Commission has testified before a Senate com-
mittee since this decision that with the law as it now is, "We don't
have to find anybody guilty of violating any law in order to get a
cease and desist order . . . I have made the charge every time I talk
to any businessman. I ask if there is anyone willing to stand up and
come forward. I will get a cease and desist order against him."'"
40. 253 U. S. 421 (1920). See FTC v. Keppel, 291 U. S. 304, 314 (1934).
41. 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920). "It is for the courts, not the Commission, ulti-
mately to determine as a matter of law what they [the words 'unfair methods of com-
petition'] include."
42. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009(e) (Supp. 1947).
43. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37.
58 (1948), protesting against "the almost absolute subservience of judicial judgment
to administrative experience [which] means that judicial review is a word of promise to
the ear to be broken to the hope."
44. Testimony of Lowell Mason, Hearings before the Trade Policies Subcoininit-
tee of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, 178 (1948).
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The Court in the Cement case upheld the Commission's conclusion
that concerted multiple use of a basing point pricing system constituted
an "unfair method of competition." " In the Rigid Conduit case this
rule has been applied to prohibit even individual use of a basing point
delivered price system.46 These holdings are despite the fact that both
the Supreme Court and Congress had previously refused to declare
the system illegal.
C. The Robinson-Patman Act
One of the most extreme instances of disregard of the express
intention of the lawmakers arises again in the Cement case, in connec-
tion with the interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act. This law
was enacted in 1936, as an amendment to the Clayton Act, for the
purpose of outlawing certain types of discriminations. Congress in
enacting the new law rejected squarely the Commission's theory that
all basing point systems and all delivered price systems should be out-
lawed. The House Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to strike
45. Adelman, supra note 4, at 1342: "I am unable to find a definition of the pro-
hibited action in Mr. Justice Black's opinion. But the following would not, I think,
be inconsistent with it: "Any series of actions by a group of business firms-not neces-
sarily involving each of them at every moment of time, and not necessarily governed
by an express or implied agreement, but operating under reasonably high probabilities
of each others' response-which tends to inhibit competition by producing a system of
identical delivered prices in a given market. . . . it is difficult to imagine a basing-
point system which would not be considered as 'unfair competition.'" Compare this
standard with Cement Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588
(1926).
46. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948). Con-
gress has refused, after repeated requests, to outlaw basing point pricing. See Hear-
ings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on the Wheeler Bill, S. 4055,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), popularly referred to as the "Anti-Basing-Point Bill."
One of the Commissioners there testified: "It is a matter of policy for Congress to
determine whether the employment of the basing point systems shall be specifically
banned by statute. . . ." Id. at 325. After extensive hearings the Committee let
the bill drop, without a report.
The furore and widespead demand for legislative reform which has followed upon
these decisions has led to an interesting anomaly. The Commission and its friends
now insist that these decisions do not mean that for which the Commission has long
contended, and those who oppose any requirements that their systems of selling be
changed now insist that the courts have already ordered such a change. Thus, those
who support the Commission contend that the Rigid Conduit case does not outlaw indi-
vidual use of a basing-point system.
See Edwards, Speech Before Small Business Advisory Committee for FTC, De-
cember 1, 1948: "Count II [of the Rigid Conduit case] amounts to a decision that it is
an unfair method of competition for an individual to participate in a tacit conspiracy."
And see Zlinkoff and Barnard, Basing Point and Quantity Discounts: The Supreme
Court and a Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 48 COL. L. REv. 985, 1005 (1948):
"Read carefully, the opinion of the court does not hold, nor did the Commission con-
tend, that individual freight absorption is illegal per se."
But see the statement of the counsel for the Commission on the oral argument:
. We have a Count II that is founded upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, and we had no such question in the Cement case, in that Count II herein
is not grounded upon combination or conspiracy, but solely upon the use of each peti-
tioner of the basing-point systen, and the effect of that use upon competition." Tran-
script of Record, p. 3692, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., supra. In connection with
the same case counsel for the Commission said, ". . . in the Conduit case, Count Il
raises the question of the status of the basing-point practice as an unfair method of
competition and independently of the question of conspiracy."
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from the bill language which would have accomplished these purposes,
with the statement that otherwise the bill could not be passed.
Accordingly, the Robinson-Patman Act proceeded to become law with-
out the language which would have achieved what the Commission
was seeking. Nevertheless, since that time the Commission has
sought, in a progressive series of cases, gradually to approach through
the medium of the courts the identical objective rejected by Congress.
It has done this by-construing the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act as prohibiting discrimination between "mill-net" prices-the in-
terpretation rejected by Congress, and one which can logically lead
only to the outlawing of all uniform delivered price systems.4"
Although the deliberate disregard of the legislative history thus
displayed by the Commission was pointed out to the Supreme Court
in the Cement case, that tribunal there accepted, at least for some pur-
poses, the same "mill-net" interpretation of price which the Congress
rejected. 9 The Court used that interpretation of the Robinson-Patman
47. See statements by Congressmen Patman, 80 CONG. REc. 7760 (1936), and
Boileau, 80 CONG. REc. 8122 (1936). Senators Borah and Van Nuys agreed that the
bill as finally passed had no effect on basing points. 80 CONG. REc. 9903-4 (1936).
See Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726, 736-7 (1945), where Chief
Justice Stone pointed out that the foregoing legislative history evidenced the clear
intention of Congress not to make the use of basing-point systems illegal per se: "Such
a drastic change in existing pricing systems, as would have been effected by the pro-
posed amendment engendered opposition, which finally led to the withdrawal of the
provision by the House Committee on the Judiciary. 80 CONG. REc. 8102, 8140, 8224.
We think this legislative history indicated only that Congress was unwilling to require
f. o. b. factory pricing, and thus to make all uniform delivered price systems and all
basing point systems illegal per se." (Emphasis added.)
48. Head, Validity Under the Robinson-Patman Act of a Uniform Delivered
Price of One Seller, 31 MINN. L. REV. 599 (1947); Head, The Basing Point Cases,
26 HARV. Bus. REv. 641 (1948). The "mill-net" theory is, briefly, that the "price" in
which there must be no discrimination between competing customers is the price at the
mill, exclusive of all freight. The result of such a theory is that to charge the same
price to two different locales would be an illegal price discrimination. The court also
neatly plugged the only remaining loophole by rejecting the defense of meeting com-
petition in "good faith" which is provided by the Act. "Nor can we discern . . . any
distinction between the 'good faith' proviso as applied to a situation involving only
phantom freight [outlawed by the Staley case; see note 50 infra] and one involving
only freight absorption." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 725 (1948).
49. When this case came before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Judicial Circuit, two of the judges remarked that the legislative history of the statute
portrayed so clearly the intent of Congress not to accept such an interpretation that
the Court could not construe that statute as the Federal Trade Commission requested
without showing a complete disregard of that legislative history:
"We know of no criticism so often and so forcibly directed at courts, particularly
Federal Courts, as their propensity for usurping the functions of Congress. If this
pricing system which Congress has over the years steadfastly refused to declare ille-
gal, although vigorously urged to do so, is now to be outlawed by the Courts, it will
mark the high tide in judicial usurpation." Cement Institute v. FTC, 157 F. 2d 533,
573 (7th Cir. 1946).
Shortly thereafter that case reached the Supreme Court, which without hesita-
tion proceeded to give the statute the very interpretation which the lower court had
so frankly characterized in advance. This was despite the vigorous dissent of Mr.
Justice Burton, who quoted the lower court's language. Thus subdued, the same Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when confronted with a similar problem, followed without pro-
test the edict of the higher tribunal. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d
175 (7th Cir. 1948).
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Act to outlaw, by words not necessary to its decision, the basing
point pricing system. It achieved this result by the very simple
expedient of saying that such systems had really been forbidden in the
earlier Glucose cases." Despite the fact that this interpretation would
have astonished Chief Justice Stone, writer of those two opinions, 5'
it is impossible to doubt the force as a judicial precedent of this sub-
sequent "restatement" in which all but one judge concurred. 2  It is
significant that immediately following the decision of the Court in the
Cement case the Federal Trade Commission announced in a format
release that it construed the decision as prohibiting not only basing
point systems but other delivered price systems as well.53
50. Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945); FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U. S. 746 (1945). That this interpretation by Mr. Justice Black was "more
sweeping than necessary to restate the holdings" in those cases, see Zlinkoff and Bar-
nard, .supra note 46, at 1002.
51. The Chief Justice there referred to the Commission's attempt to obtain "such
a drastic change in existing price systems," and concluded that "Congress was unwilling
to require f. o. b. factory pricing and thus to make . . all basing point systems
illegal per se." 324 U. S. 726, 736-7 (1945).
52. This device of making the critical determination obliquely by saying that the
issue had been already decided in an earlier case [cf. the discussion of conspiracy in
the Gypsum case and the discussion of the "possibility" of competitive injury in the
Morton Salt case, infra] is a very simple expedient for the opinion writer since he
need display no logic or reasoning to support his conclusion. It is of course, com-
pletely unsatisfactory to the lower courts and to the bar since it gives no opportunity
for argument on the merits, and it thoroughly confuses those who must thereafter con-
strue and apply the earlier "re-decided" decisions.
Compare, e. g., the Commission's request that businesses voluntarily comply with
the Cebeut decision by eliminating delivered prices, with the criticism of the cement
and steel companies for doing so, since the decision did not really compel it.
Zlinkoff and Barnard, supra note 46, at 1016. This criticism of the discontinuance
of basing point selling by the steel companies is difficult to reconcile with the sug-
gestion by the same authors in a companion article that the Government might have
proved an illegal intent on the part of U. S. Steel in the Columbia Steel case by"showing the uniform pricing system that prevails in the steel industry under the
leadership of U. S. Steel . . ." Zinkoff and Barnard, Mergers and the Antitrust
Laws: The Columbia Steel Case, The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy,
1947 Term, 97 U. op PA. L. REv. 151, 163 (1948).
53. Since that time there has been an unprecedented controversy among members
of the Commission and among their attorneys and members of their staff as to the
meaning of the decision. Some state that f. o. b. prices are not required by the de-
cision and that uniform delivered prices are proper unless a number of competitors
sell on a similar basis. See Edwards, A Summary of the Basing Point Controversy,
a statement delivered at the meeting of the Institute of Trade and Commerce Profes-
sions, New York, November 23, 1948.
See also the testimony of Walter Wooden before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Interstate Commerce Committee, supra note 44 (1948).
In the "Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Toward Geographic
Pricing Practices" issued by the Commission on October 12, 1948, the Commission,
in explaining its views in the Rigid Steel Conduit case states that it could have de-
scribed the state of facts involved in Count II as a price conspiracy because a number
of enterprises followed "a parallel course of action." It then states: ". . . the
economic effect of identical prices achieved through conscious parallel action is the
same as that of similar prices achieved through overt collusion, and, for this reason,
the Commission treated the conscious parallelism of action as violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act." (page 3). On pages 4 and 5 of the same statement the
Commission concludes that "the following types of cases may be regarded as open to
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The widespread sweeping effect of this new "judicial law" is
almost beyond measure. Commissioner Mason has stated that freight
absorption, zone prices and individual delivered prices are illegal. The
New York Times, in commenting on this interpretation of the Supreme
Court opinion said:
"If Mr. Mason's ideas should prove to be accurate, it can be
expected that the marketing procedures of all domestic heavy in-
dustry are due for revolutionary changes. Virtually all industrial
sales will be on an f. o. b. mill basis.
"Industries which are due to be affected by the outlawing of
basing point systems are the following: iron and steel, lime,
rubber, glass containers, farm equipment, paint and varnish, busi-
ness furniture, auto parts, paper and pulp, wholesale food and
grocery products, construction machinery and wholesale coal." 11
Commissioner Mason points out that if he is correct in his inter-
pretation to the effect that all delivered price systems of selling are
outlawed, the impact will be universal throughout our economy. From
five-cent Coca-Cola, five-cent gum, and fifteen-cent magazines to two-
thousand-dollar machines, nationwide uniform prices on all com-
question . . .: . . . (b) systems of freight equalization used by competitors in
such a way as to produce similar typical identities." But see Zlinkoff and Barnard,
supra note 46, at 1012: "It is an economic truism that a seller will have to continue
to meet a competitor's price so long as he wants to sell in a particular market where
his competitor has a freight advantage."
In two pending cases, National Lead Company, Civil No. 5253, Nov. 25, 1944 and
Chain Institute, Civil No. 4878, Dec. 22, 1942; amended complaint, Oct. 9, 1945, the
Commission has complained that the maintenance of uniform delivered prices which
result in varying mill net realization is in itself a violation of the Clayton Act.
Others contend that the effects of the decision are to outlaw individual price "dis-
crimination." See testimony of Professor Frank Fetter, Hearings of the Monopoly
Subcommittee of the House Small Business Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1948).
Allen C. Phelps, Chief of the Commission's Division of Export Trade, testified on
November 10, 1948, before the Senate Subcommittee that the effect of the recent decision
has been to make administrative and judicial changes in the antitrust laws which "are
inconsistent with either the implied intent of Congress or with its express intent. (P.
86.)
"Certainly no one could characterize the present confused situation as desirable
from a legal or administrative standpoint or one which could not justify study and
serious consideration of remedial measures. . . . (P. 93.)
. . . To all practical purposes it is now presumptively unlawful for any sup-
plier to sell his product at uniform delivery prices which do not take into account dif-
ferences in transportation costs." (P. 86.)
Edwin George, economist for Dun and Bradstreet, recently stated that there is at
least a tremendous amount of dispute as to whether there is confusion. When sub-
poenaed to testify before Congress, several commissioners stated that they do not inter-
pret the decision as outlawing all delivered price systems. But see the statement of
Commissioner Lowell Mason: "I believe that freight absorption is out. I believe zone
prices are out. I believe that an individual delivered price system is out." N. Y.
Times, May 23, 1948, § 3, p. 1, col. 5; Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 170 et seq.
54. Mullaney, Basing Point Seen Out in Price Fixing, N. Y. Times, May 23, 1948,
§ F, p. 1, col. 5.
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modities will be outlawed. This would affect the marketing practices
of over 82,000 manufacturers and 37,000 wholesalers.55
The ultimate economic effects of such a change in the law are the
subject of a lively current debate. Those who advocate the elimination
of delivered price systems of selling urge that the present use of these
systems results in the following disadvantages:
1. Higher prices because of lack of competition;
2. Price discrimination;
3. Unnecessary cross-hauling;
4. Excess productive capacity;
5. "Sticky" prices, because collusion is easier;
6. The uneconomic location of plants because of the lack of
competition which tends to hold an umbrella over the
inefficient producers. 6
The opponents of the change contend, on the other hand, that to
require f. o. b. selling would be to make nationwide selling impossible,
eliminate mass production, and hence cause higher prices. In place
of our present system of national selling a Balkanized economy would
result wherein each factory would have its own impregnable monopoly,
protected by judicial edict, in its own freight advantage territory. The
effect would be to decrease competition and to devastate whole eco-
nomic regions. "The Commission's systematic and inexorable demoli-
tion of communities whose principal industries labor under a freight
disadvantage in important markets would decimate whole regions. It
does not require statistical analysis to show how this would affect the
railroads." 17
Whichever school of economists proves ultimately to be correct,
there can be no question but that these changes are extreme. Walter
Wooden, Associate General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission,
in speaking of the effect of the Cement decision on the domestic
economy said recently: "He would be a bold man . . . who would
undertake to forecast in detail the nature and extent of the changes
in the pricing structure and marketing methods that will flow from
the Supreme Court's decision." "8
55. Senate Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, snpra note 44, at 177, 178.
56. See Zlinkoff and Barnard, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts, supra note
46, at 989-90; Adelman, upra note 4, at 1329-30, 1332-4, 1337-47.
57. Leighton, Seeks to Wipe Out Long-Haul Traffic, 123 RAILWAY AGE 1106
(1947). And see Zlinkoff and Barnard, supra note 46, at 1012-13, to the effect that
if f. o. b. pricing is required local monopolies will result.
58. Speech at Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, November
16, 1948.
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Regardless of the ultimate merits of the controversy it seems
abundantly clear that such revolutionary changes in our national
economy should be made, when they are made, by Congress, and not
by the Courts. Inasmuch as Congress has deliberately-and ex-
pressly 59 -rejected legislation designed to do what the Commission
sought, it would seem fitting for the Courts to refuse to rewrite the
law to accomplish that very objective.6"
D. "Possibility of Competitive Injury'"
An impressive instance of the Court's disregard of its own judicial
precedents 61 is to be found in the construction of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts, which prohibit price discriminations and cer-
tain other specified activities where the effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition." This standard, of course, calls necessarily for
judicial interpretation. During the thirty years that this language
has been in effect, the Court has with marked uniformity required the
proof of reasonable probability of competitive injury in order to
establish violation of the Act.62 One of the most recent re-expres-
sions of this rule was in the Corn Products case where Chief Justice
Stone said:
"But as was held in the Standard Fashion case, supra, with
respect to like provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act, prohibiting
tying clause agreements, the effect of which 'may be to substan-
tially lessen competition' the use of the word 'may' was not to
prohibit discriminations having 'the mere possibility' of those
consequences, but to reach those which would probably have the
defined effect on competition." 63
However, in the latest Robinson-Patman Act decision,64 the
Supreme Court threw over this long-standing statutory construction
by the simple device of saying that it had previously ruled-in the
59. See the language of Chief Justice Stone, Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S.
726, 737 (1945) ; Ceinent case in the circuit court of appeals, supra note 49.
60. See S. 241, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (Capehart resolution) (1948). "Resolved,
that the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce . . . is authorized
and directed to conduct a full and complete inquiry into the impact upon the
consumers of goods and upon small and large business in the United States of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court . . . in the case of the Federal Trade
Commission, Petitioner, versus the Cement Institute ....... Pursuant to that reso-
lution a subcommittee under Senators Capehart (80th Cong.) and Johnson (81st
Cong.) is holding extensive hearins as to the desirability of a clarification.
61. To which was added the weight of subsequent Congressional use of the same
language in the amending Robinson-Patman Act.
62. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356
(1922) ; International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U. S. 291, 298 (1930) ; Corn Products
Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726, 738 (1945).
63. 324 U. S. 726, 738 (1945).
64. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948).
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same Corn Products case-that all that was required was "a mere
possibility of competitive injury." A careful analysis of Mr. Justice
Stone's opinion in that earlier case indicates very clearly that he did
not intend to depart from the traditional interpretive rule.35 But as
a practical matter the majority of the Court has now subscribed to
Mr. Justice Black's interpretation of the earlier opinion, and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission has already served notice that it intends in
some areas to follow the new construction of the statute. Inasmuch
as similar language constitutes the test for violation of several anti-
trust measures 66 it would seem likely that this new relaxed test will
become the criterion for all such statutory provisions.
It is impressive that the FTC has referred to this as a "radical
interpretation of the law," and has since announced that it will not
use this new found standard of proof in connection with the "geo-
graphical" price cases, but will there continue to look for substantial
probability of competitive injury. 7 There is, of course, no assurance
that treble damage complainants will be equally magnanimous. Cer-
tainly the Commission's attitude will not change the law.88
CONSPIRACY
Ever since the rule of reason was adopted as an integral part of
the Sherman Act in 1911, judicial interpretations of Section 1 of that
Act-which outlaws agreement or conspiracy in restraint of trade-
have indicated fairly clearly the type of activity which will be held to
constitute such an agreement or conspiracy. It is clear, for example,
that there need be no formal contract or explicit understanding be-
tween the parties.
65. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in FTC v. Morton Salt, supra note 64, at
57-8.
66. Clayton Act, §§ 3, 7, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 14, 18 (1946);
Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(a), 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
67. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing
Practices, supra note 53, at 7 and 8: "However, there are strong reasons why the con-
cept of injury adopted by the Court in the Morton Salt case should not be applied auto-
matically to discriminations arising under geographic pricing systems. . . . In
geographical price discriminations . . . the minimum determination of injury
should be based upon ascertained facts that afford substantial probability that the dis-
criminations if continued, will result in injury to competition." But see Zlinkoff and
Barnard, supra note 46, at 1010 n. 98, criticizing the attempt to draw such a distinction
between two types of cases under the same statutory provision.
68. That the unquestioning support given the Commission's conclusion by the Court
amounts to placing the burden of proof of innocence on the defendant, see testimony
of Lowell B. Mason, Subcommittee of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee
179-180, supra note 44. And see Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the Morton Salt
case, referring to "the almost absolute subservience of judicial judgment to admin-
istrative experience [which] means that judicial review is a word of promise to the
ear to be broken to the hope." FTC v. Morton Salt, 334 U. S. 37, 58 (1948).
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Illustrative of the type of conduct which was held to sustain a
finding of conspiracy were the famous Gary dinners where representa-
tives of the Steel Corporation simply announced to the other people
present what Steel's prices were to be during the succeeding period.
It was acknowledged that the representatives of the other companies
present understood from the announcement that those were to be the
prices which they would all follow. On the other hand, it has been
consistently clear that mere price leadership pursuant to some historic
pattern in an industry-where one company leads the way on price
changes and where other companies for competitive reasons, independ-
ently follow those price changes-was perfectly legal. Thus, similarity
of action of competitors has never, standing alone, been sufficient to
sustain a charge of conspiracy.
Within the past decade, however, the Court has moved more and
more in the direction of holding conspiratorial any common action
engaged in by competitors in the same field. 9 In the recent Gypsum
case this was carried to an extreme when the Supreme Court held
that the mere fact that several companies accepted similar license
agreements from a patentee, knowing that other companies had ac-
cepted licenses containing price control provisions under the same
patents, was, where those price control provisions were enforced,
prima facie evidence of conspiracy.69a Certainly if applied to antitrust
cases generally this rule of "parallel action" would make the finding of
conspiracy a matter of rote.
70
Where the Federal Trade Commission states that it has found a
conspiracy, the Supreme Court apparently intends to sustain that con-
clusion regardless of the presence or absence of any convincing evi-
dence on the subject.71 A most striking example of this is to be found
in the facts of the recent Cement case where several West Coast c6m-
panies pointed out that although the conspiracy charged was with
regard to the use of a multiple basing point system to obtain price
identity, they did not even sell on a basing point system, but rather on
a zone price system. These companies did not use the freight rate
69. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939) ; United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265 (1942) ; see also Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC,
156 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1946). And see Adelman, supra note 4, at 1343: "In actions
alleging a price-fixing combination, there has clearly been a shift of attention from
literal collusion to what might be called the collusive effect of independent actions
taken in mutual awareness."
69a. The net effect of this holding obviously may well be to outlaw for all prac-
tical purposes the very price fixing which the General Electric case purports to permit.
70. That this is already the practical effect of the new Tobacco case, see Rostow,
The New Sherman Act, 14 U. OF Cil. L. REv. 567, 577 (1947). But see Zlinkoff and
Barnard, supra note 46, at 1012: "It is an economic truism that a seller will have to
continue to meet a competitor's price so long as he wants to sell in a particular mar-
ket. . ....
71. Cf. the Administrative Procedure Act, mtpra p. 321.
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books issued by the Institute, of which the Commission had complained,
and there was in total a virtually complete absence of any positive
evidence implicating them in any way with the activities of the other
companies. The only connection established lay in the fact that they
had at one time been members of the Cement Institute when it was a
Code Authority set up pursuant to the NRA. Yet, all that the
Supreme Court was willing to concede in regard to their contention
was that this want of evidence bore out the Commission's finding that
some of the companies were more "active and influential in the com-
bination than were others." "2 As one member of the Commission
has recently pointed out, this present trend "will make life so un-
comfortable for members of [trade] associations that the hazard of
membership will hardly be worth the legitimate advantages." 7' For
certainly mere membership in an association may now be sufficient
to tar the reputations of the most innocent companies with the mis-
deeds and indiscretions of the most guilty industry members. This
would follow regardless of complicity of the association officials in any
misdoings. Indeed, the members of the Commission appear to take
the position that mere identity of action-such as charging the same
price-is sufficient to sustain its conclusion that there has been an
illegal conspiracy.74
Certainly the trend of these decisions is to eliminate the funda-
mental distinction between innocence and guilt which has so long been
an integral part of the statute's interpretation.
72. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 718 (1948).
73. Mason, Address before the Marketing Club of Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration, May 14, 1948.
74. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing
Practices, supra note 53, at 3: "The Commission chose to rely on the obvious fact that
the economic effect of identical prices, achieved through conscious parallel action is the
same as that of similar prices achieved through overt collusion, and, for this reason,
the Commission treated the conscious parallelism of action as violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act." See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F. 2d 899 (7th
Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court appears to have subscribed to the same doctrine.
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 725 (1948) : "Each of the respondents . . .
sold some cement at prices determined by the basing point formula, and governed by
other base mills. Thus, all respondents to this extent adopted a discriminatory pricing
system condemned by Sec. 2. As this in itself was evidence of the employment of the
multiple basing point system by the respondents as a practice, rather than to meet 'in-
dividual competitive situations,' we think the FTC correctly concluded that the use of
this cement basing point system violated the act." (Emphasis added.)
Allen C. Phelps, Chief of FTC's division of export trade, testified recently that if
present trends continue, the time may come when businessmen will be prosecuted "for
their failure to compete or to conduct price wars with one another; for their individual
action in following the price leadership of a competitor . . ." Hearings before Sub-
committee of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1948).
And see the ruling of the Trial Examiner in the American Iron and Steel Institute
case: "The trial Examiner construes the Cement Institute decision and Rigid Steel Con-
duit Association, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F. 2d 175, to hold that such
conscious coincident adherence to this system of pricing and sale is, per se, some evi-
dence of agreement, combination and conspiracy." Docket No. 5508, B. N. A. Daily
Executive Reports, No. 250, Dec. 23, 1948, p. A-3.
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MONOPOLIZATION AND THE "NEW SHERMAN ACT"
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies and makes it
illegal to "monopolize" commerce. The Act in its inception was aimed
at bad big business; it was the ruthless power of the combines and
trusts-used to stifle initiative and competition-which led to the
popular demand for antitrust legislation at the end of the last century.
The subsequent history of Section 2 has, until recently, been con-
sistent with this underlying purpose of the Act. It was enunciated
clearly that mere bigness in and of itself was not illegal-large size
being in many instances a natural concomitant of our mass produc-
tion economy.7
5
The standard of guilt or innocence was monopolization of an
industry-so that competition was prevented or impaired-and the
attendant evils of high price and poor quality were threatened.
But within the past few years the Antitrust Division and the
Supreme Court have with "revolutionary speed" 76 taken large strides
in the direction of rewriting Section 2 to accord with the notions of
certain economists. These men have warned against the dangers and
evils of bigness per se, regardless of any monopoly proportions and
regardless of the size or virility of competitors." They also contend
that a situation wherein three or four companies do most of the busi-
ness in an industry is equivalent to a monopoly in its effect on com-
petition, and that accordingly mere "size and fewness" is enough to
justify a finding of guilt.7  There is also evident a marked tendency
75. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
76. Rostow, The New Sherman Act, supra note 70, at 574.
77. U. S. v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf. the language of
the four dissenting justices in U. S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 534 (1948) ;
"Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so
that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the
political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men." Id. at 535:
"The Curse of Bigness shows how size can become a menace-both industrial and
social." See also Rostow, The New Sherman Act, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 567, 577
(1947) : "In the Aluminum case Judge Hand finally interred and reversed the old
dictum that size is not an offense under the Sherman Act. Size . . . was the
essence of the offense."
Corwin Edwards, Chief Economist of the Federal Trade Commission, has recently
said that we should start with the presumption that "bigness is objectionable and
should destroy the giant enterprise unless that presumption is successfully defended."
N. Y. Journal of Commerce, Nov. 9, 1948, pp. 1, 9.
78. Rostow, The New Sherman Act, supra note 70, at 575: "Monopolistic markets
are those of a single seller, or of a few sellers . . ."; at 576: "The Supreme Court
is on the threshold of recognizing what the economists call monopolistic competition
as the offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. . . . The definition
would include the parallel situations where a small number of concerns have determin-
ing influence by reason of their position as buyers." And see CouNsFL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERs, THRnD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESMENT 17 (1948).
Cf. the O'Mahoney Bill, S. 2908, 80th Cong., Spec. Sess. (1948), providing that
in an industry where five or less companies produce 30 percent or more of the national
output, prices could not be increased without a public hearing before the FTC, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Commerce. Note that such a requirement
would govern well over the three-quarters of American industry, infra. p. 339.
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to make of Section 2 a very sweeping catch-all in which relatively
small defendants can be held guilty in the absence of any conspiracy,
intent, design, or attempt to violate the law. 9 In the recent American
Tobacco Co. case,8" involving the three large tobacco companies, the
Supreme Court held that the mere existence of power in the three com-
panies, coupled with the fact that they had been found by a jury to
have conspired to violate the law to restrain interstate commerce, was
sufficient to prove the crime of monopolization, whether or not that
power was ever actually exercised."' Equally important is the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Jackson in International Salt Co. v. United
States 12 to the effect that it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose com-
petitors from any substantial market". It should be noted that this
latter case was based purely on a conspiracy charge and did not involve
any element of monopolization. Yet in United States v. Griffith,83 the
Supreme Court recently combined that sentence with the Tobacco
holding and relied on them as a basis for ruling that the mere exercise
of superior buying power by a large competitor (which was the
dominant company in its field in a three-state area) was an illegal
monopolization, where the exercise of the buying power resulted in
the obtaining of a competitive advantage over smaller competitors.
The previously necessary element of "intent" to monopolize was sup-
plied by substituting the "effect", and the presumption that one "in-
tends" to do what he "does." This ruling came in a case where the
Government had failed to win in the lower court because it was unable
to prove any conspiracy, any agreement in restraint of trade, or any
attempt to injure or eliminate competition. In the Columbia Steel
case 8 4 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that it is no longer neces-
sary, in establishing an "attempt to monopolize", to prove unreason-
able, illegal, or unfair competitive activities. The effect of these hold-
ings may well be to make of Section 2 a well-nigh fool proof catch-all
provision. Indeed, if literally applied they would make it virtually
impossible for any accused to defend himself successfully.
79. See Bums, If You're in Business You're Probably Guilty, 28 BARRON'S
WEEKLY 5 (1948): "While [monopoly] may at one time have meant a single com-
pany in control of an industry, or a small group bound together in a trust by specific
agreement, so that they acted as one, at present the smallest company may find itself
accused of conspiring to monopolize."
80. American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 328 U. S. 781 (1946) ; see Murchison, Signifi-
cance of The American Tobacco Co. Case, 26 N. C. L. Rxv. 139 (1948).
81. Rostow, The New Sherman Act, smpra note 70, at 585: "When three compa-
nies produce so large a percentage of market supply, that fact alone is almost sufficient
evidence that the statute is violated. Ruthless and predatory behavior need not be
shown."
82. 332 U. S. 392, 396 (1947).
83. 334 U. S. 100 (1948).
84. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
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There is thus evidence that the Court is approaching a single
standard in determining whether there has been an illegal restraint of
trade or an illegal monopolization. Whether the complaint is couched
in language of a restrictive agreement between several defendants, 4a
or in an allegation of monopolization, a conviction might be obtained
simply by proving the market effect, without evidence of collusive acts,
illegal intent, or predatory practices. The Court appears thus to be
shifting to a standard of market control, the limits of which are
totally without definition, although at the same time utilizing in some
cases the older criteria of predatory tactics and collusive agreements.
The result has been, understandably enough, to produce "some novel
stresses and strains." 84b
In the Paramount case, 5 the Court ordered the District Court,
in exploring the question of monopolization of motion picture exhibi-
tors throughout the United States, to consider not only the national
scene but also to determine whether there was a monopoly in the field
of first-run houses nationally; to determine whether there was a
monopoly of first-run theaters in the 100 principal cities of the United
States; and to determine whether there was a monopolization of the
first-run theaters in any one city in the United States. This instruction
would appear to indicate that the Court will now sustain a Govern-
ment charge of monopoly even in the smallest segment of the nation's
geography, thereby increasing enormously the area of Sherman Act
activity.86  Similarly, the Supreme Court has recently held 1 that
purely intrastate activity may be found to be violative of the Sherman
Act where the products involved may ultimately move in interstate
commerce.
88
84a. Perhaps between a single corporation and its affiliates. United States v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947) ; General Motors Corp. v. United States, 121 F. 2d
376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618 (1941). And see Adelman, mpra note
4, at 1313-17.
84b. Adelman, supra note 4, at 1305, 1322.
85. United States v. Paramount, 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
86. Cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948) ; United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947).
87. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U. S. 219 (1948).
88. A very significant corollary problem is in the area of integration-which con-
notes the combining into one organization of several stages of the production, process-
ing, or marketing of a given type of product. Integration has historically proven to
be one of the most important factors in the growth of large-scale economies in our
industrial system. Certainly it would be the most severe shock to our modem economy
if businessmen were to be told suddenly that all integrated enterprises must be broken
up into independent units. Yet it would appear from Mr. Justice Douglas' language in
United States v. Paramount that this almost happened. This language was: "A ma-
jority of this court does not believe that integration in and of itself is violative of the
Sherman Act." 334 U. S. 131, 173 (1948). All that this leaves in doubt is the num-
ber of those on the bench who do feel that integrated companies are, because of the
fact that they are integrated, illegal organizations.
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In the words of one writer: "So drastic have been these deci-
sions . . . that the Department of Justice could now almost at will
drive a forensic tank right through the conventional defenses of big-
business lawyers in a Sherman Act prosecution, without having to
prove their firms guilty of a single sin, transgression, high-handed ac-
tion, frailty, error, or weakness. The DJ's argument need be worded
only in economics; the corporation need only be strong and it is in
the wrong." "
RETROACTIVITY: A CRIMINAL ASPECT
The element of the retroactive application of the Supreme Court
decisions is a most significant one. It is, to be sure, the traditional
concept of the interpretation of any statute to assume that the statute
has meant at all times since its enactment exactly what the Court rules
today or tomorrow is the proper statutory interpretation. But it is
this factor which so seriously disturbs the confidence of the business-
man in the motives and judgment of the court when it suddenly dis-
regards long-standing and widely accepted interpretations of the
statute.90 When a judicial interpretation of fifty or sixty years stand-
ing is overnight thrown into the discard, it means necessarily that all
those who have relied on the accepted interpretation are law violators
and subject to suit, conviction, and treble damage actions because of
their conduct covering a period of three years in the past. This is
particularly serious in view of the Court's present policy of allowing
evidence of no matter how great antiquity to be introduced for the
purpose of establishing the "pattern" or the "state of mind" which will
be projected on down into the three-year period within the Statute
of Limitations.9 There are instances in recent decisions of Court
reliance on documents written 25, 30, 40, and even 70 years prior to
Presumably there are four such justices. Cf. the dissent in United States v. Colum-
bia Steel Co.: "We need not hold that vertical integration is per se unlawful in order
to strike down what is accomplished here." 334 U. S. 495, 539 (1938). However,
this objective has been definitely blocked by five of the justices, at least for the present:
"It seems clear to us that vertical integration, as such without more, cannot be held
to be violative of the Sherman Act." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra, at
525. For a criticism of this case, see Zlinkoff and Barnard, supra note 52. For a
brilliant discussion of the problem of integration, see Adelman, supra note 4, at 1312-22.
89. Fleming, Bignest Fast Becomes Top Economic Crime, Christian Science Moni-
tor, May 28, 1948.
90. See Burns, supra note 79, at 6: "It is a serious question for business to what
extent the Supreme Court should have the authority to make retroactive decisions,
which not only change accepted business practices, but render almost every business-
man subject to criminal penalty . . . with the Supreme Court making the change,
it dates back to the time the antitrust laws were passed, and makes criminal what even
the justices themselves concede had not been considered criminal prior to the decision."
91. Civil suits for private damages are governed by the respective state statutes
of limitations, not the Federal statute. Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry, 203 U. S. 390
(1906).
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the time of the filing of the suit. A resolution of the Board of Di-
rectors of the Pullman Company, which was adopted in 1870-20
years prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act-was relied on by
the court in the Pullman case in finding, 73 years later, the intent
to monopolize.2
These problems are particularly serious when the charge in the
case involves criminal responsibility. In one recent litigation the
Government brought an indictment against several companies charg-
in!g illegal price fixing in the manufacture and sale of a patented com-
modity." In one aspect of the case the innocence or guilt of the de-
fendants turned on the applicability and validity of the rule of the
General Electric case. The questioned license contract was entered
into in 1928, and was drafted in reliance on the Supreme Court deci-
sion 2 years earlier. At the time of the indictment in 1941 the General
Electric doctrine had been repeatedly sustained by all courts. At the
time of the trial of the criminal case, in 1947, the General Electric
doctrine, though frequently criticized, had been consistently applied
by lower courts and had never been shaken in any Supreme Court
decision. It was only subsequent to the trial, while the parties were
awaiting the judge's decision, that the Line Material, Gypsum, and
Paramount cases-all severely confining the area of General Electric
application-were decided. The Court's decision turned in large part
on the application of these cases (decided after over 45 years of the
traditional interpretation), and expressly rejected the defense argument
that such re-interpretation was analogous to an ex post facto law, on
the ground that the constitutional prohibition applies only to statutes .
4
Jeremy Bentham, in a famous criticism, wrote in 1792:
"When your dog does anything you want to break him of,
you wait until he does it and then you beat him for it. This is
the way you make laws for your dog; and this is the way the
judges make laws for you and me. They won't tell a man before-
hand what it is that he should not do-they won't so much as
allow of him being told; they lie by until he has done something
which they say he should not have done and then they hang him
for it." 95
Mr. Justice Cardozo once suggested that an expedient might be
for courts in announcing that they no longer subscribe to earlier
92. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
93. United States v. Carboloy, 80 F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. 1948). The indict-
ment was returned in 1941. The trial ran from Jan. 21 to March 27, 1947. Decision
against the defendants was entered October, 1948.
94. United States v. Carboloy, supra note 93. But see Jackson, Decisional Law
and Stare Decisis, supra note 8.
95. Quoted in Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions, 17 A. B. A. J. 180 (1931).
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judicial precedents to apply the old interpretation to the facts in the
case being adjudicated, but to announce that henceforth a new inter-
pretation will apply. 6 This practice would be helpful insofar as the
individual litigant involved in the pending case is concerned. It would
not protect those who have acquired a potential liability by acting in
reliance on the old rule in such a way that they will be subject to dam-
ages for that past conduct.
REMEDIES
That the punishment should fit the crime is both a time and a
lyrically honored legal maxim. The Supreme Court has recently given
very careful attention to the matter of the relief to be decreed in anti-
trust cases. It has evidenced this interest by a curious mixture of
careful review of and participation in lower court decrees \where they
do not satisfy it, and by complete self-abnegation and an attitude of
withdrawal where the lower court has entered a decree with which it
sympathizes. In the International Salt case the Government charged
that the defendant had, in leasing its salt dispensing machines, required
that the lessees obtain the salt tablets from the lessor; as a remedy
the District Court not only ordered the illegal contracts cancelled, but
also ordered the salt company to sell its machines on uniform terms to
any and all applicants. This order the Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that it is up to the trial court to impose the remedy to correct
the wrongs alleged. 7 In two of the Motion Picture cases, despite pains-
taking and arduously worked out district court decrees, the Supreme
Court set aside the lower court orders, with virtual instructions to
order divestiture of the defendant exhibitors, which the lower courts
had refused, regardless of the fact no "national monopoly" had been
found, and regardless of the fact that both courts were in agreement on
the issue of the defendant's culpability.9" In the recent Federal Trade
Commission cases the Court has given the impression that it will up-
hold any order entered by the Commission which the Commission feels
is necessary to remedy the situation found.99
The most sefious aspect of the whole problem of the proper
remedy lies in the field of dissolution. The Department of Justice has
96. HALL, SELECTED WITINGS OF CAnOZO 35-37 (1947).
97. "The framing of decrees should take place in the District rather than in Ap-
pellate Courts. They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to
fit the exigencies of the particular case." International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U. S. 392, 400-401 (1947).
98. Compare also the complete revision of the lower court decree in Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), with the complete affirmance of
the decree in United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
99. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948); FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U. S. 37 (1948).
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been pressing persistently in the recent cases to obtain divestiture of
the defendants' business; this attempt has been made consistently
whether or not the size of the units sought to be broken off or frac-
tionalized relates in any way to the illegality complained of. Thus, in
the National Lead case the Department sought in the first instance to
have National Lead and Du Pont compelled to go completely out of
the titanium business, although the issues in the case did not turn at all
on monopolization but rather on an illegal conspiracy in connection
with a world-wide cartel. When the Justice Department was unsuc-
cessful in this regard, it then sought to have the business of each of
the companies in titanium pigments broken into small units so that
there would be a large number of competitors instead of the current
four. The Court refused this relief on the ground that it was in no way
shown to relate to the illegal conduct of the defendants. However, in
the subsequent Paramount and Schine cases the Court, speaking
through a different justice, went to very much the opposite extreme of
compelling the lower courts to re-examine the question of divestiture
(which the lower court had refused to order). The Supreme Court
went out of its way to say that disintegration of companies found to
have violated the law should not be confined simply to cases of
monopolization but might also be ordered where an illegal conspiracy
has existed. The Court stated that that relief sometimes was neces-
sary in order to remove from the defendants any advantage which
their illegal conduct may have given them.' 0
It is the announced intention of many of those in the Antitrust
Division to obtain to the greatest extent possible the breaking up of
large industrial enterprises. In view of the recent decisional encour-
agement, it is logical to assume that in an increasing percentage of the
antitrust suits pending and to be brought in the future, the Antitrust
Division will seek to have divestiture ordered regardless of the facts
involved in the particular case.' 0'
Needless to say, the economic implications of such a program are
enormous. Whatever one may think as to the merits of large com-
100. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948). Yet .the
historic rule had been that an equity decree should do no more than enjoin the illegal
activities of the sort complained of; it should not be punitive. See Local 167 v. United
States, 291 U. S. 293, 299 (1934).
101. See Complaint, United States v. Armour Co., N. D. Ill., Sept. 5, 1948, asking
that four large packing companies be broken into fourteen companies.
In addition to the National Lead and Motion Picture cases, see United States v.
Libbey-Owens Ford Co., Civil No. 5239, N. D. Ohio (the Flat Glass case), consent de-
cree entered, Oct. 30, 1948; United States v. General Electric Co., Civil No. 1364, D. C.
N. J. (the Incandescent Lamp case), still pending. See also the Petition of United
States for Divestiture, filed in United States v. Aluminum Co., Eq. No. 85-73, S. D.
N. Y. 1948. Compare the complaint in United States v. New York Trap Rock Cor-
poration, S. D. N. Y., 1948; United States v. Western Electric Co., D. C. N. J., Jan.
14, 1949. Cf. the recommendations of Corwin Edwards, mipra note 77.
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panies in any industry, the problem certainly cannot be solved intel-
ligently by a random series of antitrust prosecutions and indiscriminate
disintegration.
If, for example, we accept the thesis of some economists that the
Sherman Act should be interpreted as outlawing the large units in any
line of commerce when a few of them predominate in that industry," 2
some examination is indicated to disclose the number and nature of
the industries-and the portion of the entire economy-so constituted.
Willard Thorp, in a TNEC Monograph 10 3 reported a cross-section
sample of the manufacturing industry which "presents a comprehensive
over-all picture of the situation existing in the entire manufacturing
segment of the economy." The author computed as to each manu-
factured product a "concentration ratio", showing the proportion of
the total quantity output of that product accounted for by the four
largest producers in that field. His findings were that "approximately
three-fourths of the total number of products had concentration ratios
above fifty per cent, about one-half of all the products analyzed had
concentration ratios above seventy-five per cent and nearly one-third
had concentration ratios above eighty-five per cent."
The interpretation advocated by this school of economists would
thus entail--depending on the percentage which the Court concluded
constituted "predominance"-the wrecking and rebuilding of the eco-
nomic pattern in from one-third to three-fourths of our entire indus-
trial economy.
The members of the Supreme Court are not selected on the basis
of economic proficiency. It is unreasonable to expect a handful of
men with no prerequisite of training in that highly complex field to
pass intelligently on the purely economic issues with which they are
being increasingly confronted.104
The resolution of legal issues-the interpretation and application
of the law-must remain the function of the judiciary exclusively, but
it is in the transition from the legal function of decision to the economic
one of remedy-specifically, dissolution, divorcement and divestiture-
that the difficulty and the danger arise. To the extent that the ultimate
102. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act, supra note 70, at 585: "When three
companies produce so large a percentage of market supply, that fact alone is almost
sufficient evidence that the statute is violated. Ruthless and predatory behavior need
not be shown."
103. TE STRucTuRE oF INmusTRY, No. 27, 274-5 (1941).
104. That the decision in the Columbia Steel case augurs an era in which the
Court will decide antitrust cases on the basis of "intelligent economic thinking" rather
than on prior standards, see Zlinkoff and Barnard, supra note 52. Thus the decision
will "furnish the Federal Judiciary with the most helpful criteria . . . [for] dealing
effectively with the growing concentration of economic power which threatens to un-
dermine and destroy both our political democracy and our system of private, free, com-
petitive enterprise." Id. at 175.
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resolution of the problem of divestiture is left to judicial determination,
it is recommended that the Court be advised in each case by a non-
partisan board of economic experts.
Such a board, comprised of representative and qualified experts,
would be called on to study both the facts of the case and the conditions
in the industry, to report to the court on the effects on the national
economy of the relief requested by the enforcement agency, and to
make recommendations as to the maximum limits of any decree. These
experts might well be representatives designated by each of the several
departments of the government qualified to make recommendations in
the light of the interests served by each cabinet officer. Thus, the
interests of the Department of .National Defense, of the State Depart-
ment, of the Treasury Department and the Labor Department would
receive consideration in the resolution of the problem presented.
The Court would, of course, remain free to accept or reject the
report and recommendations of the board.
THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY
The extent and the nature of governmental trade regulation is a
function the responsibility for which must in the ultimate be borne by
the representatives of the people themselves. °5
There is much to be said for the proposition that a re-examination
of American business problems should be made from time to time.
It is submitted, however, that the examination, and any action based
on it, are the function of the legislative branch of the Government.
Judges and lawyers whose training and obligation direct them toward
interpretation and enforcement of the law should not be left indis-
criminately to make not only new laws as they go along, but also
to reform the economy of the nation to suit their personal notions of
economic or social justice. This is, indeed, conceded both by members
of the enforcement agencies and by some of the judges themselves.
105. Encouraging judicial recognition is found in the recently decided United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 526 (1948). There the majority said:
"It is not for courts to determine the course of the Nation's economic development.
. . . If businesses are to be forbidden from entering into different stages of produc-
tion that order must come from Congress, not the courts."
Compare with this the enthusiasm of Mr. Rostow in hailing the "revolutionary
speed" with which the Sherman Act has lately been transformed: "Recent decisions
have given the Department of Justice its greatest opportunity . . . to seek enforce-
ment of the law on a grand scale, and in ways which might produce not piddling
changes in the detail of trade practice, but long strides toward the great social pur-
poses of the statute." Rostow, The New Sherman Act, .upra note 52, at 574. See
also the pregnant language of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for four justices in United
States v. Columbia Steel, supra, at 536: "Power that controls the economy should be
in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial
oligarchy." That this suggests federal ownership, see Hendershot, Monopoly Ruling,
N. Y. World Telegram, June 9, 1948.
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The Antitrust Division has made it quite clear that it considers
its function to be that of enforcing the antitrust laws indiscriminately,
in the light of its own notions of what those laws prohibit-, and that
that function must be fulfilled regardless of the effect upon our economy.
The Antitrust Division has recently urged:
".. . a purpose to advance the art is no defense to a charge of
violation of the antitrust laws . . . Accordingly, resort to pleas
of special necessity, the peculiar circumstances of an industry,
good motives, or the beneficial influence of a monopolistic cor-
poration or combination is unavailing. Where special circum-
stances exist which require a departure from free competition,
only Congress has the power to decree such a variance." 100
Similarly the courts frequently express the belief that it is their
duty to enforce the laws regardless of the economic effects. The
responsibility for changing the law, if such effects are not always
desirable, lies with Congress. In United States v. National Lead Com-
pany the court rejected the defense that the only way for American
companies to compete abroad in a cartelized world is through adoption
of similar practices in international trade, and that the alternative will
be a loss of foreign business:
"The validity of this argument has been the subject of con-
gressional inquiry . . That kind of inquiry, rather than a
judicial one, is appropriate to the evaluation of the merits of the
proposition. For the courts it is conclusive that Congress has not
yet validated such a solution to the problem. . . . Only Congress,
not the courts, may grant the required immunity." 107
106. Brief for the United States, pp. 150-151, United States v. General Electric
Co., Civil No. 1364, D. C. N. J., 1949. That the Department's views in this respect
are the complete antithesis of those it held a few years ago is eloquently evidenced by
Thurman Arnold, who was Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Di-
vision at the time the above suit was brought. As Assistant Attorney General he
said:
"At the outset I wish to emphasize that the Sherman Act does not condemn
as unreasonable the business combinations necessary for the efficient mass produc-
tion or distribution of goods." (Address of Jan. 27, 1940.)
". .. the antitrust law . . . says to every private combination, 'You may
grow and use your power so long as you can justify that power in greater savings
to the consumer because of increased efficiency, or some other purpose recognized
by Congress or the common law.'" (Address of Feb. 1, 1940.)
"Indeed, we do not wish to destroy combinations which pass on savings to
consumers through economical marketing methods or the efficiency of mass pro-
duction. It is not size itself, but the creation of bottlenecks and toll bridges in the
distribution of a product which is unreasonable under the law." (Address of Sept.
13, 1939.)
107. 63 F. Supp. 513, 526 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) :
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The problem of monopoly in our economy is not in any sense
diminished; there is no question but that the laws against illegal re-
straints of trade and ruthless business aggression must continue to be
vigorously applied in the interests of free competition and of the con-
suming public. The urgent need is for an adequate, intelligent anti-
trust policy; for fair, vigorous, impartial enforcement of the law.
At the same time it must be emphasized that antitrust action
alone, no matter how vigorous or how successful, cannot solve pure
economic problems. Governmental prosecutors should not be per-
mitted to utilize these statutes in an attempt at such a unilateral
solution. There are many other factors which must be considered.
Attacks on bigness as such spring from the failure to realize that large
size may be both the cause and effect of efficiency, and that efficiency
may be a substantial factor in the success of our economy, in the
higher standard of living of the workingman, and in the military secu-
rity of our nation."'° a Prior to the adoption of its current anti-bigness
policy, even the Antitrust Division conceded that business efficiency
should not be the object of Governmental attack:
"This program does not stop the efficiency of mass produc-
tion. . . . It condemns only the illegitimate uses of the privileges
of organizations for purposes which cannot be justified ...
"We do not want to destroy efficiency. We do not wish to
destroy great organizations. We only wish to compel such
organizations to justify themselves as an aid to free trade." 108
This language has a strange archaic flavor in the light of the
attacks by the Department in recent suits. Yet it is certainly un-
"True, it might have been thought adequate to condemn only those monopo-
lies which could not show that they had exercised the highest possible ingenuity,
had adopted every possible economy, had anticipated every conceivable improve-
ment, stimulated every possible demand. . . . Be that as it may, that was not
the way that Congress chose; it did not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad'
ones; it forbade all."
With this language Judge Hand rejected as irrelevant the attempt of the Alumi-
num Company to prove that its position in the aluminum market had been a beneficial
one, that it had not received excessive profits, and that its prices had been reasonable.
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 526 (1948) : "It is not for
courts to determine the course of the nation's economic development."
107a. For a brilliant discussion of the problems of size and concentration from the
standpoint of the economist, see Adelman, supra note 4, at 1291-1304. And see Eric-
son, Criterion of Corporate Bigness-Social Welfare, Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
18, 1948, p. 15, col. 5.
108. Address of Thurman Arnold, "The Antitrust Laws and Agriculture," Feb. 1,
1940.
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deniable that a single-minded attack on bigness as bigness is not the
solution of our problems.10 9
Other factors must be given a full measure of consideration, and
for this reason decisions of governmental policy, particulary insofar
as life or death sentences for American industrial units are concerned,
should not be left exclusively to the judgment of the courts. Unless
the antitrust enforcement program is made an integral part of the
over-all economic program it may conceivably work in a direction
diametrically opposed to our primary objectives.
The foregoing considerations suggest the conclusion that there
is need for a constant consideration and review of the antitrust program
and the antitrust laws by the Congress. It was the Congress which
declared its policy of preserving competition by its enactment of the
Sherman and Clayton and related acts many years ago. The scope,
the interpretation, and -the practical effect of these statutes in this
entire field have varied considerably through the years with changes
in administration and in the economic beliefs of the law enforcement
officials and of the judges. These changes and trends have not been
given adequate study and consideration by the members of Congress,
with the result that the law enforcement agencies and the courts have
been left free, in very great measure, to write un-edited text matter
into the interstices of the antitrust statutes.
It is accordingly recommended that Congress establish a pro-
cedure for reviewing the antitrust problem, in coordination with the
entire underlying economic program.
In order that the Congress may play a more realistic role in the
shaping and evolution of the laws which it, itself created, it is rec-
ommended that a Joint Congressional Committee be designated to
serve permanently in this field. The Committee should be assigned
the responsibility of reviewing the antitrust laws, of studying the
present scope which has been given to them, of reviewing the effective-
109. "No one contends that antitrust action alone will solve all of our economic
problems. . . . Antitrust is a part, an important part, of the united effort which
must be made in working toward economic solutions. Other policies on the part of
government, business and labor must also contribute to the success of enterprise."
"Significance of the Sherman Act," an address by Attorney General Tom Clark, Sept.
25, 1945.
The Policy Statement of Department of Justice issued May 19, 1939, reads:
"It will be generally agreed, that the statutes should be interpreted and admin-
istered . . . to the end that their great and beneficial purposes may be achieved
without doing unnecessary harm to business and reputable business organizations.
Hit or miss prosecutions, instituted without due consideration of all the facts or
consequences involved, are harmful to business and government alike."
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ness of the enforcement of the laws thus far, and considering the course
into which the laws should be directed in the future."0
Such a committee could then influence a consistent governmental
policy in regard to business relations-a policy founded on the broad
base of consideration of the welfare of the nation as a whole."' In
the event the Antitrust Division or the courts undertook to interpret
or apply the Congressional statutes in a manner detrimental to the
welfare of the public, or contrary to the intent of Congress, the Com-
mittee would be prepared to recommend that Congress reshape the
law to remove the improper interpretation, or to correct mistakes
Congress itself might have made in drafting the original law. In this
way, therefore, the public would be assured for the first time that its
interests would be given paramount consideration in the interpretation,
the construction, and the application of the statutes which regulate
American business and industry.
There is adequate precedent for this suggestion in the Joint Com-
mittee on Labor Management Relations created pursuant to the Labor
Management Relations Act, Title IV." 2  This Committee, created to
review the operation and interpretation of the act so that the nation's
labor laws would function in accordance with the public welfare, was
intended to review the application and enforcement of the act and to
make suggestions for modifications of the law wherever necessary to
suit the ends for which it was designed.
110. Cf. S. 241 as adopted June 10, 1948, by the Senate Interstate Commerce
Committee, authorizing an inquiry "into the status of business enterprise in the United
States." The Senate Judiciary Committee has adopted S. Res. 255, authorizing a gen-
eral antitrust investigation.
111. Compare on a broader front the Employment Act of 1946, the major ob-
jective of which was the creation of an over-all economic policy. This Act created
a three-man Council of Economic Advisers to prepare annual data on which the Presi-
dent can base an economic report and recommendations for legislation, which he is
required to submit to Congress at the beginning of each calendar year. It also created
the Joint Economic Committee composed of members of both houses of Congress, to
analyze the President's report and to submit a report on which Congress could base its
own program.
112. 61 STAT. 160, 29 U. S. C. A. § 191 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
